



Local Planning Guidance on Terrorism Response

*A Supplement to the Emergency Planning
Guidance for Local Government*

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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide planning guidance for:

- The integration of federal, state and local government into a cohesive terrorism response organization at the local level;
- The identification of terrorism response planning requirements and shortfalls;
- The development of terrorism response plans and procedures; and,
- The identification of training needs and requirements to support terrorism response efforts.

While this planning guidance is designed for use by local government (as defined in the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS), it may also be used for planning purposes by Operational Areas (OAs). State or federal agencies that support local government through field offices may also find this a useful planning guidance document. This guidance is not meant to be used as a tactical field operations guide (FOG).

Crisis Management and Consequence Management

The California Terrorism Response Plan introduces two new terms to the emergency management field: Crisis Management and Consequence Management. These two terms, unique to terrorism, describe how the response to people committing an act of terrorism (Crisis Management) and the response to potential or actual effects of that activity (Consequence Management) will occur.

The federal government exercises lead authority and responsibility in crisis management. The federal crisis management effort is led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary. Final authority to make decisions onscene regarding the causes of the incident, such as securing the scene perimeter, identifying and rendering weapons safe, and capturing terrorists rests with the FBI's

On-Scene Commander (FBI OSC).

The State of California and local agencies exercise lead authority to make decisions regarding the consequences of terrorism. This includes the authority on-scene to make decisions regarding rescue and treatment of casualties, and protective actions for the community. Under the California SEMS, this on-scene authority would normally rest with the incident commander and local emergency services organization. The federal government provides assistance as required. FEMA coordinates federal agencies consequence management support with the State of California.

Crisis management and consequence management encompass the preparedness, alert and warning, response, and recovery phases of emergency management. **See Appendix B, “Terrorism Response Actions”. Note that this chart highlights the interaction and overlap between crisis management and consequence management.**

Interactions between the Federal Response System and SEMS.

This section briefly addresses the interaction between the federal response system and SEMS in California. In order for the systems to function well together in an emergency response, all the components will need to engage in coordinated planning efforts and maintain continuous dialogue to address key issues and concerns—well before a terrorist event.

Once an incident has occurred, the nature and magnitude of the incident will determine the degree of local response and the amount of state and federal assistance required. These guidelines will apply:

- The state and local consequence management response will be conducted according to SEMS.
- The state and federal governments will coordinate their response according to the *California-Federal Emergency Operations Center Guidelines* and the *California Terrorism Response Plan*.

The Chart “**Terrorism Response Organizations**”, see **Appendix A**, summarizes the key potential terrorism response organizations at different levels of government.

The FBI will establish a command post near the site which will serve as the base for crisis management operations at the scene. This command post structure generally consists of three functional groups: Command, Operations, and Support, and is designed to accommodate participation of other agencies. **See Appendix C, “Organization and Organization Charts”.**

In a terrorist threat or incident in the United States, the FBI will establish a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to manage and coordinate the federal field response. California will maintain a liaison presence in the JOC which is connected back to the SEMS organization. Refer to the *California Terrorism Response Plan* to see how these organizations relate to each other. Local emergency management will be also be represented in the JOC. **See Appendix C, “Organization and Organization Charts”.**

A unified command should be established at the field level which includes agencies/organizations that have jurisdictional or legal authority for the incident. When necessary, private organizations or businesses should be incorporated into the unified command.

Threat Analysis and Notification

State

State OES has established the State Standing Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT). The purpose of the SSCOT is to monitor terrorist trends and activities, determine the potential impact and related damage of validated terrorist threats, plan for the coordinated and comprehensive emergency response to such events, and provide timely guidance to SEMS organizations for agencies responding to specific threats or events. It also provides advice to OES management, other state agency directors, and the Governor’s Office. The SSCOT is composed of representatives from key state and federal agencies, including the FBI. Membership in the SSCOT may be modified according to need. The SSCOT will coordinate threat analysis and notification efforts with local jurisdictions on an as-needed basis. A complete description of the SSCOT and SSCOT notification procedures contained in the California Terrorism Response Plan.

See the State Standing committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) portion of the *California Terrorism Response Plan*.

Local

As part of the preparedness process, local government should work with the appropriate FBI field office to develop their elements of the threat analysis and notification systems. Appendix D contains information about threat evaluation and conditions, as well as, threat notification processes. These local elements would include:

- Establishing a threat analysis working group. This working group may be composed primarily of law enforcement personnel, but should also involve representatives from other disciplines. For example, public health or medical representation may be advisable to address the impact of biological or chemical agents. This group may have day-to-day functional elements from law enforcement or other agencies, may meet on a periodic basis, and should ideally function as the core for threat analysis in case of a threat/actual event.
- Protocols and procedures for sharing threat information. It is advisable to determine potential information needs and information flow prior to a threat or event. **See Appendix D, “General Notification Procedures”,** for the potential information distribution for threat **information at the local level.** *The California Terrorism Response Plan* describes the state level threat analysis and notification process.
- Notification forms and formats. Agencies are encouraged to develop notification forms and formats that can be used across disciplines. **See Appendix D, “Threat Report Elements”,** for suggested data elements for threat analysis and notification.
- A process for recommending courses of action, such as activation of the OA EOC, based upon the results of threat analysis and notification. **See Appendix D, “Threat Analysis and Notification”,** which includes data elements on recommended courses of action.

Working Groups

Jurisdictions have found it useful to develop working groups composed of key stakeholders to address terrorism response planning issues. The working groups frequently have subgroups that address specific crisis and consequence management concerns, such as threat analysis and

notification procedures. Current working groups are described below.

In the Los Angeles area, the Terrorism Working Group [TWG] was formed in 1996. With 44 members from a variety of government agencies and disciplines, this group meets monthly to develop plans, procedures and systems related to terrorism issues. Within the TWG there is a Terrorism Early Warning Group which serves as a sounding board for threat information. They provide periodic intelligence estimates and white papers which are derived from open source information. They also develop warnings based on criminal intelligence and investigations.

In the San Francisco area, a similar group exists, co-chaired by the Governor's Office of Emergency Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Named the Bay Area Terrorism Working Group, it is composed of members from regional federal agencies, OES, and larger local jurisdictions. Activities include contingency planning, training, threat awareness and liaison. This group does not engage in the gathering of criminal intelligence or pursue investigations. A similar group is being organized in the Sacramento area.

Note: These entities should not be confused with the terrorism task forces established in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas. The Los Angeles Task Force on Terrorism [LATFOT] and the San Francisco Counterterrorism Task Force [SFCTTF] are staffed with peace officers and intelligence analysts, and are separate and apart from the planning projects discussed in this guidance.

PLANNING ACTIONS

Section Description:

This section is designed to raise planning issues that a local government may want to address in developing, refining, and exercising their terrorism response plans and procedures.

This section addresses planning actions local governments may want to take in the following areas:

- Management
- Operations
- Planning/Intelligence
- Logistics
- Finance/Administration
- Training and Exercises

Planning Considerations:

- Local government should address both Crisis Management and Consequence Management as components of the planning process.
- Governments should consider what specific actions are required during both Crisis Management and Consequence Management.
- Governments should examine the potential consequences of a terrorist event, such as a dam failure, fire(s), civil disturbances, hazardous materials incidents, transportation problems, a requirement to activate the medical and health systems, and so on.
- Local governments should plan for a range of terrorist scenarios, from the lone assassination attempt to the complexity of a WMD incidents.

- With terrorism, the infliction of psychological pain, trauma, and fear is the overall objective of the terrorist. Therefore, emergency planners should include planning that will minimize psychological suffering for both victims and responders. Mental health support and psychological operations can be equally important to the emergency response as any other preparedness or response activity.

Management

There are several areas management may want to focus on during the planning process, including: organizational structure, coordination of various disciplines, inclusion of non-profit organizations or private businesses in the possible response organization, public information concerns, safety and security, and information sharing among the key players. In addition, management may also want to be involved in threat analysis, plans, and procedures development.

Organizational Structure

Local government should consider the organizational structure required for a terrorist threat or actual event. Organizational structure should be viewed from both the crisis management and consequence management viewpoints. In developing the organization, agencies may want to address the following questions:

- How should organizational and planning issues be addressed? Through multi-agency terrorism working groups (TWGs)? Through regional as well as local efforts? Much of the success of future terrorism response efforts will depend upon establishing close working relationships among the key players at various government levels.
- What organization is already in place to deal with terrorism?
- How will they interface with their federal counterparts in FBI and FEMA?
- What levels of government need to be represented?

- What are the procedures for liaison to FBI? State OES? Others?

- What organizational elements need to be represented?

For example, the unified command?

- How will the transition from crisis management to consequence management be accomplished—if necessary?
-

Coordination of Disciplines

A terrorism event will require multi-agency, multi-discipline coordination at all levels, including first responders. Questions to consider:

- How do local jurisdictions plan to coordinate medical, health, fire and rescue, public works, law and coroner?
 - What are the issues associated with discipline coordination? In the EOC environment? In the field?
 - What communication systems and protocols need to be in place?
 - How will education and child care facilities be addressed?
 - How will animal care issues be addressed?
-

Inclusion Of Non-Profit Organizations And Private Businesses

Non-profit organizations and businesses may get involved in a terrorist threat or event, either as potential victims or as possible support organizations. Given these two possible scenarios:

- What non-profit organizations need to be involved in terrorism response planning? How do local jurisdictions include them in terrorism response?
- Are there businesses that need to be involved in terrorism response planning? Would they be potential targets? Could they provide support to emergency operations?

Public Information

All Public Information personnel should review current

plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

As we have seen in California during our natural disasters, public information plays a crucial role in managing an event. Some questions to consider are:

- What system(s) are available to alert the public?
- What protocols need to be established by local government?
- How does local government ensure support and cooperation with the media on a potentially sensitive subject?
- What protective actions need to occur for government response personnel, the public?
- How does local government and the media address bilingual and multicultural concerns?
- What public information organizations need to be established? Media centers?

Safety and Security

All Safety and Security personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

Staff safety and operational security will be key concerns during a terrorist threat or actual event. Questions to consider:

- What actions do local governments need to take to protect their staff?
- What actions need to be taken to insure operational security, including protection of computer systems and telecommunications assets?
- What security measures are necessary, and when? Are there security protocols?
- Do the key responders know the security protocols?
- What agencies have responsibility for security?

- What agencies have responsibility for safety?
-

Information Sharing and Dissemination

Information sharing and dissemination will be crucial during a terrorist threat or actual event. How an event unfolds will be determined to a great extent by “information” and how it is processed. Questions to consider:

- What protocols need to be established about sharing threat information? How will various disciplines share information across discipline lines, i.e., law enforcement to medical?
 - What components of the local response organization need to have information?
 - What information elements need to be shared? And with what agencies, organizations, businesses, volunteer organizations, the media, and so on?
 - Do agencies need to have “alert levels”, “readiness conditions”, or use “threatcons” – even those that do not normally use these terms? (Refer to Appendix D.)
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Operations

This section addresses concerns that may surface during terrorism response planning for branches normally associated with Operations. (This description is based upon the State OES REOC branch configuration; it may be adapted to local planning requirements.)

Each section contains questions to consider for the Crisis Management and Consequence Management Phases. Some questions are prompted by the practice of terrorists of using response personnel and facilities as secondary targets. (A terrorist tactic is to explode a second bomb after response personnel have arrived to deal with the initial terrorist event.)

Fire and Rescue Branch

All Fire and Rescue Branch personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for fire and rescue to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario?
- Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat?
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on evidence preservation.)

Consequence Management Concerns

- Will fire and rescue be able to co-locate functions with other disciplines, such as law enforcement, for coordination purposes? (Which functions need to be co-located?)
- Will fire and rescue need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event?
- Will fire and rescue operations require additional support from other branches, such as hazardous materials?
- How will fire and rescue deal with the potential that they may become secondary terrorist targets upon response to an event?
- How will fire and rescue expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day emergency response? What will be required to do this?
- Are fire and rescue branch personnel prepared to coordinate with law enforcement on mass evacuations and spontaneous evacuations?

**Hazardous
Materials/Radiological
Branch**

All Hazardous Materials/Radiological personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for hazardous materials/radiological to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario?
- Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat?
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on chemical agent identification.)
- What additional technical support teams will be required for a terrorist situation?

Consequence Management Concerns

- Which hazardous materials or radiological functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination purposes?
- Will the hazardous materials or radiological branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event?
- Will hazardous materials or radiological branch require extensive logistical support for their operations?
- How will hazardous materials or radiological team personnel deal with the potential that they may become secondary terrorist targets upon response to an event?
- How will hazardous materials expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day emergency response? What will be required to do this?
- How will the hazardous materials personnel address the clean up concerns while addressing the sensitivities of evidence collection?
- How will the environmental needs be addressed?
- Have radiological personnel prepared for an incident?
- Are decontamination procedures in place for personnel in the case of both radiological and chemical incidents?

Law Enforcement Branch *All Law Enforcement personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.*

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for law enforcement to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario?
- Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat?
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on chemical agent identification.)
- What additional technical support teams will be required for a terrorist situation?
- What are the investigation and evidence tracking issues and how should these be addressed?

Consequence Management Concerns

- Which law enforcement functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination purposes?
- Will the law enforcement branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event?
- What additional logistical support will law enforcement require for operations?
- What does law enforcement need to do to minimize their potential as a prime secondary targets upon response to an event?
- How will law enforcement expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day emergency response?

What will be required to do this?

- Are law enforcement personnel prepared to conduct mass evacuations and deal with spontaneous evacuations?
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Coroner Operations

Generally all of the standard mass fatality concerns would apply for coroner operations during a terrorism response. There are some additional concerns, which are listed below:

Consequence Management

- Documentation. It is extremely important to ensure that deceased recovery location is marked and noted. Is this part of coroner procedures?
- Transport of Deceased Remains. Deceased should be moved only in Human Remains Pouches (HRP), to prevent contamination. Responders should not attempt to separate co-mingled remains, or re-associate dis-associated remains. (These are tasks which should be accomplished at the morgue.) Has transport of remains been addressed in procedures?
- Evidence Recovery. One issue may be recovery of evidence attached to/imbedded in the deceased. This is usually handled during the morgue process, but must be established as part of the procedure. Most evidence technicians or investigators are not experienced or capable of working in a morgue during a post mortem. Also, all deceased should be x-rayed to identify any explosive materials and/or foreign materials. Have these issues been included in procedures?
- Decontamination. One area is decontamination of the deceased prior to leaving the scene to prevent contamination of facilities. This requires setting up a specific decontamination procedure prior to transportation to the incident morgue or central morgue facility. It may also be necessary to establish a temporary morgue for any work with contaminated deceased. Do procedures address and deal with these areas?

- Securing of personal effects. Personal effects may have evidentiary value. They may be contaminated. They may be needed to assist in identification or at least in BTB (“believed to be”) identification. They must be secured for release to the family if appropriate. Are there provisions for these areas in the procedures?
- Recovery and identification of the deceased. This is usually the highest priority of the family. This may conflict with the other issues in a terrorism response. Contamination, evidence collection, and secondary devices, may preclude this being a priority. The bodies may have to stay at the morgue for some time, leading to appearances that the deceased are not being treated with “appropriate dignity”. How should these issues be addressed?
- Different identification procedures. The identification procedures for large numbers of terrorism casualties may be different from normal ID procedures. Again, there may be decontamination issues, or dismemberment concerns. Do procedures address these areas?
- Decision making. Coroner staff may need to make some hard decisions about extent/type of invasive procedures, or burial methodology, such as hermetically sealed caskets. How are these decision points addressed in procedures?
- Establishment of a Family Assistance Center. Mass fatalities management usually includes such centers. The centers facilitate information flow. They may also insure that family members aren’t contaminated, if contamination is an issue. Family members may need to be available for interviews, identification notifications, and remains disposition. Do procedures include the centers?

**Medical and Health
Branch**

All Medical and Health personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for medical and health to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario?
- Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat?
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on chemical agent identification, biological hazards or decontamination procedures.)
- What additional technical support teams will be required for a terrorist situation?

Consequence Management Concerns

- Which medical or health functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination purposes? (For example, there are instances in which medical and hazardous material personnel may need to conduct joint activities with hazardous materials.)
- Will the medical and health branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event? What will be the source of this aid?
- Will the medical and health branch need to establish significant logistical support for operations?
- How will medical and health personnel deal with the possibility that they may become secondary terrorist targets upon response to an event?
- How will medical and health expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day emergency response? What will be required to do this?

- Should medical and health personnel establish contacts in the private sector prior to an accident for quicker access to supplies and/or personnel?
- Are decontamination procedures in place for medical personnel?

If the event is a MCI (mass casualty incident) how will medical personnel address the need for the possible massive amounts of mutual aid required?

- What coordination needs to occur with coroner and law enforcement?
- What coordination needs to occur in connection with evacuations, either of medical facilities or shelters?

Mental Health

Medical and health also includes mental health support, which will focus on support to victims of a terrorist incident and support to response personnel, including EOC staff. Mental health planners should consider the same sort of questions that other elements of the medical and health community address. In addition, plans should incorporate the following areas:

Staff Background and Training

- Do your mental health staff have the requisite training in disasters, terrorism, and dealing with trauma?
- Do they have an understanding of governmental response roles?
- Are they able to function as part of a multi-disciplinary team?

Crisis Management

- Public information: What role does mental health play as part of public information?
- Support services: How can the mental health community provide crisis counseling, screening, diagnosis, and treatment for those in need of such

services?

- Stress Management: How can mental health support stress management programs within the EOC and other locations?
- Follow-up: What mental health follow-up programs need to be developed as a result of a threat or event?

Consequence Management

- Integration and support: How do mental health activities integrate with and support other medical/health activities?
- Resources: What mental health resources are available within the community? Will additional mental health resources be required? How can non-medical support personnel, such as religious staff or social services personnel, be integrated into the process?
- Psychological aspects: How can mental health professionals address the psychological aspects of response activities such as: body recovery, identification, family notification, and transportation of the injured?
- Support to Care and Shelter: How can mental health support care and shelter operations?
- Public Information: What role does mental health play as part of public information?
- Support Services: How can the mental health community provide crisis counseling, screening, diagnosis, and treatment for those in need of such services?
- Stress Management: How can mental health support stress management programs within the EOC and other locations?
- Follow-up: What mental health follow-up programs need to be developed as a result of a threat or event?

Care and Shelter Branch

All Care and Shelter personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for care and shelter to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario?
- What special instructions do care and shelter personnel need to receive regarding a potential terrorist threat?
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on facility security procedures or mental health concerns during a terrorist event.)
- What level of facility security will be required for care and shelter operations during a terrorist situation?

Consequence Management Concerns

- At what levels of the emergency response organization should there be care and shelter representation? Field level incident command post? City EOC? OA EOC?
- Will the care and shelter branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event? If so, what will be the source of this aid?
- Will the care and shelter branch need to establish significant logistical support for its operations? How will this connect to other logistical support, such as medical?
- How will care and shelter personnel deal with the possibility that care and shelter facilities may become secondary terrorist targets?
- How will care and shelter personnel handle mass evacuations and spontaneous evacuations. How will local law enforcement and fire personnel address this situation?

**Construction and
Engineering Branch**

All Construction and Engineering personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

This branch may include public works, local and state agency representation, and private concerns. It may include representatives from professional organizations.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for construction and engineering to consider:

- Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario? If so, how should they be modified?
- Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat? (For example, do public works personnel need to be told about a potential terrorist threat, so that they can be alerted to be aware of unusual activity?)
- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on explosive devices identification.)
- At what levels of the emergency response organization should there be construction and engineering representation? Field level incident command post? City EOC? OA EOC?
- What additional technical support teams will be required for a terrorist situation?

Consequence Management Concerns

- Which construction and engineering components need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination purposes? (For example, there are instances in which construction and engineering personnel may need to conduct joint activities with search and rescue personnel.)
- Will the construction and engineering branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event? If so, what will be the source of this

aid?

- Will the construction and engineering branch need to establish significant logistical support for operations?
 - How will construction and engineering personnel deal with the possibility that they may become secondary terrorist targets upon response to an event?
 - How will construction and engineering expand their operations to accommodate the emergency response?
 - How will building inspectors and other professionals be included in the process?
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Utilities Branch

All Utilities personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the area(s) listed below are addressed.

- The utilities branch may be composed of both public and private utilities organizations, in the areas of potable water, waste water and sewage treatment, gas, telecommunications, and electricity. The branch may, of necessity, coordinate extensively with the construction and engineering branch.

Crisis Management Concerns

Questions for the Utilities Branch to consider:

- What are the vulnerabilities to terrorist activities for utilities?
- Do existing utilities procedures need to be modified to accommodate a terrorist scenario? If so, how should they be modified?
- Do utilities field personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential terrorist threat? (For example, do utilities personnel need to be told about a potential terrorist threat, so they can be alerted to be aware of unusual activity?)

- What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event? (For example, refresher training on explosive devices identification or hazardous materials identification.)
- At what levels of the emergency response organization should there be utilities representation? Field level incident command post? City EOC? OA EOC?
- What additional utility technical support teams will be required for a terrorist situation?

Consequence Management Concerns

- Which utilities components need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination purposes? (For example, there are instances when utilities personnel may need to conduct joint activities with fire and rescue personnel?)
- Will the utilities branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the consequences of a terrorist event? If so, what will be the source of this aid?
- Will the utilities branch need to establish significant logistical support for operations?
- How will utilities personnel deal with the possibility that they may be either primary or secondary terrorist targets upon response to an event?
- How will utilities expand their operations to accommodate the emergency response?

Planning/Intelligence

There are at least two main areas to consider in this area:

- 1) Threat analysis and
- 2) Identification of gaps and shortfalls in plans and procedures.

Threat Analysis

Threat analysis evaluates three areas:

- Technical feasibility: Is the threat technically feasible?
- Operational practicality: Is it operationally possible to accomplish?
- Behavioral resolve: Do the potential terrorists possess the resolve to accomplish the threat?

Threat analysis, closely defined, is predominately a law enforcement operation. See the preceding section on threat analysis.

However, other sections within the emergency response organization may also do “broad” threat analysis. (For example, what public works facilities would be logical targets for a terrorist?) Such analysis defines potential problems and addresses “what ifs”.

Local governments may also want to examine their existing information sources and processes to see how they could be used to monitor for threats. (For example, public health monitors disease outbreaks as part of its standard surveillance function. The existing system(s) could be brought on-line and enhanced in the instance of a biological threat.)

Another possible area to examine would be facilities that might be potential targets, i.e., schools, public utilities, transportation hubs, industrial facilities with hazardous materials, hospitals, and dams.

For example, the Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA) will be registering the facilities that present the greatest risk in a hazardous materials scenario. Local jurisdictions may want to coordinate with their FBI offices regarding potentially vulnerable facilities.

**Identification of Planning
Gaps and Shortfalls**

After reviewing the items contained in this Planning Actions section:

- What needs to be done?
- What are the action items?

- Who needs to do them?
- What are the timelines?
- Does the local jurisdiction need an entirely new plan to address terrorism, or can existing plans and procedures be modified?
- Does the jurisdiction need technical assistance to bring plans and procedures into line with the terrorist threat?

Local jurisdictions may want to develop action plans (or work plans) to address issues raised by these questions. It may be necessary to establish “terrorism working groups” both internally and externally to:

- address and resolve issues,
 - develop plans and procedures, and
 - train and exercise on plans and procedures.
-

Logistics

As part of the planning process for the terrorism response, local government will probably identify support requirements (supplies, services, equipment, facilities, etc.). Resources databases will also need to be identified, developed, and maintained. Logistics planners will probably want to identify critical support operations, such as computer operations, that must remain intact and functional during an event.

Support Requirements

In identifying support requirements, the following questions should be considered:

- What assets do local jurisdictions have to deal with the terrorist threat?
 - What do they think they might need to overcome shortfalls?
-

- Do local jurisdictions know how to access/request resources from other sources?

There are a number of terrorism response teams -- what do local jurisdictions need to know about these teams and their capabilities? Do they need training on accessing these teams?

Resources Data Bases

Development and use of the appropriate databases will be essential to the response effort. Some questions to consider:

- What resources databases exist? How does the local government access them?
 - What resources do they need to manage and how?
 - Does the jurisdiction need to develop a terrorism specific resources database? What should be in this database? Should its accessibility be restricted in some way?
-

Finance/Administration

Issues which may need to be addressed include: continuity of operations, such as payroll processing, and tracking the costs of an event.

Continuity of Operations

Questions to consider regarding continuity of operations:

- What systems do local jurisdictions have for personnel tracking and payroll operations?
 - What are the staff recall procedures?
 - Will there need to be a terrorism response specific set of recall procedures?
-

Cost Tracking

Like any other emergency response, local jurisdictions will want to track costs associated with a terrorism response. Is there anything unique to terrorism response that will impact cost tracking procedures?

Training and Exercises

Training and exercises are a crucial component for a successful terrorism response program. There are several areas which local jurisdictions may want to consider:

- Development of a Terrorism Response Training Program
 - Existing Training Programs
 - Terrorism Awareness Programs
 - First Responder Training
 - Exercise Program
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**Development of a
Terrorism Response
Training Program**

The local jurisdiction may want to develop a comprehensive program, based upon its training needs assessment. The program would include maintenance of training records.

Key questions to consider:

- What are our training needs?
- Can we identify our training needs?
- What do we need to do to meet our training needs?

**Existing Training
Programs**

Some questions regarding existing training programs to consider:

- Are there existing programs, such as hazardous materials training programs, that address potential components of a terrorism response?
 - How can local jurisdictions use SEMS training for terrorism?
 - Do existing programs require the addition of a “terrorism” module?
 - Do existing programs address scenario gameplaying?
-

**Terrorism Awareness
Programs**

Questions to consider regarding terrorism awareness programs:

- Does the local jurisdiction need to develop and conduct a terrorism awareness program?

- Who should get the awareness training?
 - Does the awareness training include a quick orientation module that personnel can take, in anticipation of a potential threat?
-

First Responder Training

Questions to consider:

- What First Responder Training already exists that can be used by the local jurisdiction?
 - Where does the first responder training fit with other training elements?
 - Does the jurisdiction need to develop first responder training?
 - Does the jurisdiction need assistance in developing its training?
-
- What training needs to be implemented for dispatch centers? For the fire and rescue service? For EMS? For hazardous materials? For law enforcement?
-

Exercise Program

Questions regarding exercise programs:

- What is the current exercise program? Can it be modified to accommodate terrorism concerns?
 - Does the jurisdiction need to develop a separate exercise program for terrorism?
 - Who should develop, conduct, and maintain the new terrorism response exercise program?
 - Does the jurisdiction have the resources to conduct such exercises?
 - What about funding for the program?
-

SAMPLE PLAN (Model City Terrorism Plan - Santa Luisa Del Mar)

This **sample** plan uses the **fictitious** city of Santa Luisa Del Mar to highlight key planning concepts for terrorism response. The organizational structure for Santa Luisa Del Mar is outlined in the Emergency Planning Guidance for Local Government (January 1998). This sample plan reflects that organizational structure.

SAMPLE PLAN

Introduction

In the wake of the World Trade Center bombing in New York and the Oklahoma City bombing, terrorism has become an increasing concern for emergency management, emergency responders, and the public at large.

This plan augments the existing Santa Luisa Del Mar City Plan.

Concept Of Operations

This plan or the applicable portions of this plan will be implemented as directed by the City Manager, Director of Office of Emergency Services (OES), or Incident Commanders as appropriate.

The SEMS functions for a terrorism response are indicated in Attachment B, Terrorism SEMS Functions.

In accordance with California Terrorism Response Plan, dated August 1998, this plan reflects two new terms in the emergency management field:

- Crisis Management
- Consequence Management

Santa Luisa Del Mar has developed two working groups to address terrorism response planning. One group is the Santa Luisa Del Mar Terrorism Working Group (TWG) which addresses generic planning concerns. The other group is the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group which deals with threat analysis and notification issues and will also be activated during a threat/actual event.

Crisis Management

Crisis Management is the law enforcement response to the causes of terrorist incidents, terrorists, and their weapons. It includes measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, isolate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

The federal government exercises lead authority and responsibility in crisis management. The federal crisis management effort is lead by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with assistance from other federal, state, and local agencies as necessary.

Consequence Management

Consequence management addresses the consequences of terrorism, the effects upon people, their property, and their communities. It includes measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to government, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism.

The State of California and local agencies exercise lead authority to make decisions regarding the consequences of terrorism. Under California SEMS, this authority would normally rest with the incident commander and local emergency services organization. The federal government provides assistance as required. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates federal agencies consequence management support with the State of California.

Hazard Analysis for Terrorism

According to the "Likelihood of Occurrence" Matrix, from the Santa Luisa Del Mar City Plan, terrorism is an infrequent hazard with moderate to high severity for the city.

Threat Analysis for Terrorism

The California Terrorism Response Plan , dated August 1998, describes the Threat Notification Procedure used by the State Office of Emergency Services and FBI. Upon receipt of a terrorist threat, the City of Santa Luisa Del Mar will notify the appropriate FBI office. Depending upon the threat, the city may choose to also notify the Santa Luisa Sheriff's Department and selected city departments. Notification of the OES Regional Office may also occur.

The City of Santa Luisa Del Mar OES has developed a

broad threat assessment of potential terrorist targets. This assessment is contained in a restricted use planning document maintained by Santa Luisa Del Mar OES. The information contained in this document will be used as necessary during a threat situation or actual event.

The City of Santa Luisa Del Mar has also established a joint Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group with the FBI, Santa Luisa Sheriff's Department, and other key stakeholders. The TEW Group will permit the city to maintain a cooperative mechanism for comprehensive and integrated early warning for terrorism within the city. The TEW Group will use pre-established notification and analysis formats and procedures.

Management

Management assignments are reflected in "Terrorism SEMS Functions", Attachment B.

Mental health support and psychological operations will be essential elements of the terrorism response approach.

Organizational Structure

The Santa Luisa Del Mar EOC will activate the appropriate SEMS functions based upon the terrorist threat or actual event.

The following personnel will be assigned to the Federal Joint Operations Center (JOC) if the JOC is activated and representatives are requested:

- Representative to Consequence Management Group: Santa Luisa Del Mar OES staff person (minimum staffing: 1 person per shift)
- Representative to Crisis Management Group: Staff person from Santa Luisa Del Mar Police Department (PD) or Santa Luisa Sheriff Department representative (minimum staffing: 1 person per shift)

If the FBI activates its Incident Command Post (ICP), the Santa Luisa Del Mar PD or Santa Luisa Sheriff Department will provide a representative to the ICP. (minimum staffing: 1 person per shift)

Santa Luisa Del Mar will also provide representation to, and participate in, the Unified Command, once established.

Note: Santa Luisa Sheriff Department personnel will be requested through mutual aid channels to provide support to Santa Luisa Del Mar PD.

**Coordination of
Disciplines**

Santa Luisa Del Mar will use multi-agency, multi-discipline coordination in its response to a terrorist threat or event.

A Unified Command will be established from the various agencies with responsibility for the incident. The Unified Command will facilitate coordination among agencies and disciplines.

Staffing in the Santa Luisa Del Mar Dispatch Center will be augmented to expedite response activities. A Dispatch Coordinator who has received terrorism response training will be assigned to oversee dispatch operations.

Areas of special concern may be:

- Coordination with education and child care facilities.
 - Animal care issues, including care, shelter, and possible public health concerns.
-

**Inclusion Of Non-Profit
Organizations And Private
Businesses**

Non-profit organizations, such as the American Red Cross, and private business concerns will be involved in terrorism response planning in Santa Luisa Del Mar.

The Santa Luisa Del Mar EOC will contact the appropriate non-profit organizations and private businesses in the event of a potential threat or actual event.

Public Information

Santa Luisa Del Mar is committed to a proactive public information program during a terrorist threat or actual event.

The Santa Luisa Del Mar Public Information Officer (PIO) has developed some standardized terrorism response public

information messages that may be used during an event. The Santa Luisa Del Mar PIO has also coordinated with media representatives regarding terrorism awareness.

The PIO will also involve mental health professionals in public information as needed.

The Santa Luisa Del Mar Public Information Officer will be brought into response planning activities as soon as practical during a terrorist threat or actual event.

If the federal government establishes a Joint Information Center (JIC), the Santa Luisa Del Mar PIO will dispatch a representative to the JIC. The Santa Luisa Del Mar PIO will maintain a PIO presence at the JIC as long as determined by the situation. News release procedures will be agreed upon, and established, for the Santa Luisa Del Mar EOC, the Unified Command, and other interested parties.

Safety and Security

During a potential threat or actual event, employee safety and operational security will be key concerns for Santa Luisa Del Mar staff.

Santa Luisa Del Mar has developed day-to-day security plans and procedures for city facilities. City staff will be trained on these plans and security procedures.

During actual emergency operations, heightened safety and security procedures will be in force and will be followed by city staff. Security and safety procedures will also be implemented for all command posts and other operational sites. The City PD will serve as lead for security functions.

If additional security assets are needed by the PD, they will be requested through mutual aid or obtained through other sources, i.e. private security agencies.

Information Sharing and Dissemination

The threat of a terrorist act or actual terrorist event raises significant issues regarding information sharing and dissemination. Security and confidentiality concerns must

be weighed against operational needs and public interest.

The notification of a potential terrorist threat and subsequent updates will be made verbally through the most secure form of landline available. Written confirmations of notification and updates will be used. Emergency response personnel will observe communication security procedures. Sensitive information will not be communicated by cell phone or radio.

The following systems will be used by Santa Luisa Del Mar to disseminate information:

- CLETS (California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System): for law enforcement information
- RIMS (Response Information Management System): for information among the SEMS levels of government
- Santa Luisa Del Mar City Dispatch: for field operations

The Santa Luisa Del Mar EOC will have scheduled briefings for EOC staff and other emergency response personnel. If the federal JOC, federal ICP, Incident Unified Command, or JIC are operational, the Santa Luisa Del Mar EOC will coordinate briefing times, reporting approaches, and news releases as much as possible with its federal counterparts, as well as with other SEMS levels.

Office of Emergency Services

The Santa Luisa Del Mar OES will be responsible for updates and maintenance of this plan.

Santa Luisa Del Mar OES will be responsible for management of EOC operations. The City OES will also provide staff for key positions at other locations.

Police Department

Within the EOC, the City PD will assume the security function. The PD will also function as a conduit for crisis management issues. Potential areas which the PD may address are:

- Law enforcement mutual aid
 - Evacuation concerns, including mass and spontaneous evacuations
 - Intelligence concerns
 - Investigative guidelines and statutory authority
 - Hostage situations, hijackings, kidnappings
 - Use of force
 - Bomb procedures
 - Facility and personnel protection
 - Use of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) units
-

Fire Department

Potential areas which the FD may address are:

- Support to Crisis Management activities
 - Fire and rescue mutual aid
 - Support to hazardous materials operations
 - Coordination with EMS and hospitals
 - Personnel protection issues
 - Evacuation concerns, including mass and spontaneous evacuations
 - Coordination with public works and utilities
-

Administration

The City Manager will oversee the administrative function in the EOC.

Finance

The City Budget Officer will oversee the finance operations within the EOC and will insure that costs for a potential or an actual event are tracked in a timely manner.

Operations

See Terrorism SEMS Functions, Attachment B.

The Operations Chief will be either a police department or fire department staff person, depending upon the situation and availability of staff.

Fire Department

The City Fire Department will be the lead for fire response, hazardous materials events, and medical/rescue operations. The Fire Department will provide support as necessary to the Police Department for Crisis Management activities. Existing procedures, such as the Santa Luisa Del Mar Hazardous Materials Procedures, will be modified and used where possible. It will assist with:

- Perimeter and access control
- Evacuation operations
- Notifications
- Safeguarding evidence
- Damage assessment and
- Fatalities management

Potential areas of concern may include:

- Addressing environmental needs
- Obtaining personnel with radiological training
- Insuring decontamination procedures (radiological and chemical) in place and
- Insuring biological agents containment

The Fire Department will request fire and rescue mutual aid if needed to accomplish these functions.

Police Department

The Police Department will be the lead for crisis management, perimeter security, access control, traffic/crowd control, evacuations, notifications, and safeguarding evidence. Crisis management activities may include investigation, tracking, and maintaining scene integrity. The Department will also coordinate coroner

issues.

It will assist with damage assessment and fatalities management.

The Police Department will request law enforcement mutual aid if needed to accomplish these functions.

Public Works

Public Works will serve as lead for damage assessment and will be the representative for utilities concerns. Potential public works activities include:

- Reconnaissance of public infrastructure (roads, bridges, facilities, and utilities)
- Alternate route identification
- Building access
- Utility access rerouting
- Temporary repairs

It will assist with access and crowd control and fatalities management.

Public Works will request public works mutual aid if needed.

Public Works will coordinate with the PD on city facility security issues.

Parks and Recreation

Parks and Recreation will assist with fatalities management and care and shelter issues. Potential care and shelter issues are:

- Refresher training on security or mental health concerns.
- Care and shelter facility security
- Care and shelter representation within the EOC and other locations
- Potential mutual aid requirements

- Logistical requirements for care and shelter
 - Care and shelter facilities as terrorist targets
-

**Medical/Health and
Mental Health**

City OES has worked with local hospitals, health care providers, and the Santa Luisa County Health Department to develop a separate medical plan for terrorism response. This plan addresses the following areas:

Medical/Health

- Modification of existing protocols to address terrorism response issues
- Medical first responder guidelines
- Refresher training procedures
- Coordination with other disciplines, such as hazardous materials
- Technical support team requirements
- Mutual aid procedures
- Logistical support requirements
- First responder security and personal protection concerns
- Procedures to access privately owned and operated medical assets
- Decontamination procedures
- Mass casualty incident (MCI) concerns

Mental Health

- Staff training in disasters, terrorism, and emergency management
- Public information and mental health

- Mental health support services
 - Mental health follow-up programs
 - Integration of mental health with other programs
 - Support to care and shelter and other operations
 - Stress management programs for responders
-

Planning/Intelligence

See Terrorism SEMS Functions, Attachment B.

The Planning/Intelligence Chief position will be filled by a City OES staff member. In addition to the standard situation, documentation, demobilization, and resources units, Planning/Intelligence may include units that address crisis management and consequence management concerns. Planning and Intelligence will include representation from the Threat Early Warning (TEW) Group.

Planning/Intelligence will include mapping and geographic information systems (GIS) products.

Threat Analysis

Threat analysis planning and intelligence activities will address two key areas:

- Law enforcement and crisis management activities
- General threat analysis

Information developed during the threat analysis process will be shared with the appropriate agencies. Release of threat analysis information to the public will be based upon coordination with the PIO.

Office of Emergency Services

City OES will provide staff for the situation and demobilization units.

Administration

Administration will provide staff for the documentation unit and will be responsible for that unit's function.

Community Development	Community services will provide staff and be responsible for the resources unit.
Police Department	The City PD will address Crisis Management issues, as necessary.
Fire Department	The City Fire Department will assign technical specialists to assist with fire and rescue, hazardous materials, and medical information.
Public Works	City Public Works will be responsible for maintaining and updating the facilities and utilities information.
Logistics Support Requirements	<p>The unit will be responsible for identifying supplies, services, equipment, and facilities that will be required for both crisis management and consequence management activities.</p> <p>During emergency operations, particular emphasis will be placed on maintaining the operational capabilities of city computer systems and telecommunications, including land line and radio.</p> <p>See Terrorism SEMS Functions, Attachment B.</p>
Resources Databases	As part of its planning effort, City OES has developed a resources database for terrorism events. This database also identifies potential shortfalls and indicates potential sources to remedy the shortfalls. The database is a restricted use database.
Administration	City Administration will serve as lead for the logistics section.
Community Development	Community Development will assist with any logistics requirements for evacuation.
Police Department	City PD will provide input on law enforcement logistical

support requirements.

Fire Department

City Fire Department will provide input on fire and rescue, hazardous materials, and medical logistical support requirements.

Public Works

City Public Works will assist with logistics requirements for evacuations.

Finance/Administration

Issues which may need to be addressed include:

- continuity of operations
- tracking the costs of an event

See Terrorism SEMS Functions, Attachment B

Continuity of Operations

It will be necessary to ensure continuity of day-to-day operations during a potential threat or actual event. This includes payroll processing, contracts management, and personnel actions.

Cost Tracking

It will be necessary to track costs associated with an event or potential event. Within Finance/Administration there may be a separate Cost Unit.

Administration

Administration will assist with EOC operations.

Finance

Finance will be responsible for the Cost Unit.

Training and Exercises

Training and exercises will be in accordance with the Santa Luisa Del Mar master training schedule. The schedule includes an annual terrorism response exercise, terrorism awareness courses, First Responder Training, and joint training with Santa Luisa County. See Attachment C, Master Training and Exercise Schedule.

Attachments

- Attachment A, Likelihood of Occurrence
-

- Attachment B, Terrorism SEMS Functions
 - Attachment C, Master Training and Exercise Schedule
-

Attachment A

Likelihood of Occurrence

					Severity	
Hazard	Infrequent	Sometimes	Frequent	Low	Moderate	High
Dam Failure	X					X
Earthquake M<5			X	X		
Earthquake M>5	X					X
Wildland Fire		X			X	
Floods		X		X	X	X
HazMat			X		X	X
Landslides	X			X		
Civil Disturbance	X			X		
Extreme Weather/ Storm		X			X	
Aircraft Crash	X					X
Train Accident	X			X	X	X
Major Vehicle Accident		X		X		
Terrorism	X				X	X
Tsunami	X				X	

Attachment B

Terrorism SEMS Functions

	Mgmt/ Command	Operations	Planning/ Intell.	Logistics	Finance/ Admin.
Incident Command	PD				
Establish Perimeter		FD,PD			
Control Access		FD,PD,PW			
Traffic/Crowd Control		PD,PW			
EOC Operations	ADMIN,FD, FIN, OES, PD	PD,FD,PW, P&R	CD,ADMIN	ADMIN,PW, PD	FIN,ADMIN
Evacuation		FD,PD		CD,PW	
Notifications		PD,FD			
Safeguard Evidence		PD,FD			
Public Information	PD,FD,OES				
Med/Rescue Ops.		FD,P&R			
Damage Assessment		PD,FD,PW			
Situation Status			CD,PD,FD,PW		
Documentation			ADMIN,OES		FIN
Fatalities Mgmt.		PD,FD,PW, P&R			

Attachment C

Master Training and Exercise Schedule

<u>1st Quarter</u>	<u>2nd Quarter</u>	<u>3rd Quarter</u>	<u>4th Quarter</u>
Awareness Training	First Responder	Exercise Preparation	Joint Exercise with Santa Luisa County
Course consists of two components: 1. an orientation to terrorism 2. personal awareness and protection	Training for First Responders has three components: 1. refresher on terrorism issues 2. personal awareness and protection 3. discipline specific technical information	City EOC Exercise Scenario to be determined Field component: None	Activation of both City and County EOCs Scenario to be determined Field component to be determined, depending upon scenario
Audience: All Santa Luisa Del Mar Staff	Audience: PD, FD, PW, selected medical personnel	Participants: Staff assigned EOC duties	Participants: Staff from both City and County assigned EOC duties Staff for field component: To be determined

Notes: This is a generic master training schedule. At the beginning of the training year, training coordinators from Santa Luisa Del Mar and Santa Luisa County will meet to identify the training emphasis and objectives.

REFERENCES AND APPENDICES

REFERENCES

SOURCE	DOCUMENT
Governor's Office of Emergency Services	California Terrorism Response Plan, Final Working Draft, August, 1998
Governor's Office of Emergency Services	Law Enforcement Guide for Emergency Operations, 1998 Edition
Governor's Office of Emergency Services	Emergency Planning Guidance for Local Government, January, 1998
Governor's Office of Emergency Services	California-Federal Emergency Operations Guidelines, April, 1998

APPENDICES

APPENDIX	SOURCE
A - Terrorism Response Organizations	Developed for the Guidance
B - Terrorism Response Actions	Matrix
C - Organization and Organization Charts	Developed for the Guidance From the FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction Contingency Plan
D - Threat Analysis and Notification	Developed for the Guidance <ul style="list-style-type: none">• General Notification• Threatcons• Response to a WMD Threat• Threat Report Elements
E - Unified Command/SEMS: A Guide for State/Local Government	Governor's Office of Emergency Services, August, 1998
F - Acronyms	Developed for the Guidance

APPENDIX A - POTENTIAL TERRORISM RESPONSE

Purpose

To outline various terrorism response organizations.

This table describes the potential terrorism response organizations at different levels of government. It is broken into two time periods: 1) preparedness, and 2) notification of potential/actual event.

Government Level	Preparedness	Notification of Potential/Actual Event
Federal	FEMA National, FEMA Region IX, FBI Field Offices (Sacramento, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego)	FEMA National, FEMA Region IX, Regional Operations Center (ROC) Disaster Field Office (DFO) FBI Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) (Washington., DC) FBI Joint Operations Center (JOC) (operated by FBI Field Office(s) ¹
State	State Standing Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) State OES State Agencies	State Standing Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) State OES State Operations Center (SOC) State Agencies Departmental Operations Centers (DOCs)
Regional	State OES Regional Offices State Agency District or other offices Bay Area Terrorism Working Group (BATWG) Sacramento Area Terrorism Working Group (SATWG)	State OES Regional Emergency Operations Centers (REOCs) State Agency District Offices
Operational Area (OA)	Operational Area government (may include provisions for terrorist threat assessment group or terrorism working group (TWG))	Operational Area EOC May include activation of terrorist threat assessment group or elements of the terrorism working group (TWG)

Local Government	Local government (May include provisions for terrorist threat assessment group or terrorism working group (TWG))	Local government EOC(s) (May include activation of terrorist threat assessment group or elements of the terrorism working group (TWG))
Field		Unified Command FBI Command Post Metropolitan Medical Strike Teams (MMSTs) First Responders (Law, Fire & Rescue, Medical, Public Works) Various special purpose teams, such as the National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) Teams

1 Exact location to be
determined.

APPENDIX B - TERRORIST RESPONSE ACTIONS

Crisis Management	Consequence Management
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Threat notification and assessment within law enforcement community. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of EOCs (City and OA), REOCs, and SOC as applicable.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of threat assessment organizations, such as the State Standing Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) or the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group in Los Angeles. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First Responders deployed to incident site(s).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Activation of selected elements of the emergency response organization based upon the situation and in accordance with SEMS. May include partial activation of OA or city EOCs, REOCs, or SOC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Unified Command activated at incident site(s).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Alerting of key first responders at the local level, if warranted by situation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FBI JOC may collocate with impacted jurisdiction's EOC. Continued threat analysis.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Time-critical refresher training, if applicable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence collection at site(s).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Initiation of consequence management planning as applicable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mutual Aid System activated as necessary (law, coroner, fire and rescue, hazardous materials, medical/health, mental health, public works, utilities).
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review of evidence gathering procedures and protocols, if applicable. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Public information protocols and procedures activated.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FBI activates JOC. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FEMA becomes involved in consequence management.

Notes: Crisis Management and Consequence Management time frames may overlap. Crisis and Consequence Management activities will require close coordination.

APPENDIX C - OA/JOC COMBINED ORGANIZATION

**Model JOC/OA
Organization**

To be developed.

**OA/JOC
Los Angeles/
San Diego**


- The FBI Los Angeles and San Diego Field Divisions have been discussing a combined OA/JOC organizational structure with the LA OA and San Diego OA. The intent is to merge the JOC with the OA EOC as much as possible to facilitate the terrorism response. Future guidance documents may reflect the result of these discussions.
-

**FBI San Diego
Joint Intelligence
Concept**

- San Diego FBI is also developing a joint intelligence center concept. Subsequent revisions of this guidance will reflect organization charts that are consistent with these developments.
-

APPENDIX C (continued) - FBI ORGANIZATION CHARTS


FBI On-Scene Commander This command post structure generally consists of three functional groups: Operations - Support - Command as shown in the following chart.



APPENDIX C (continued) - FBI ORGANIZATION CHARTS

FBI Joint Operations Center

In a terrorist threat or incident in the U.S., the traditional FBI command post is expanded into a JOC incorporating a fourth functional entity, the Consequence Management Group. This Consequence Management Group consists of representatives from federal, state and local consequence management organizations to address the pre-release and post-release consequence operations (see Figure 3). This expansion of the command post into a JOC allows the FBI to facilitate its responsibility as the LFA to manage crisis and consequence operations concurrently.



APPENDIX D - THREAT ANALYSIS AND NOTIFICATION

**Law Enforcement
Response**

Evolution of Law Enforcement Response to a Terrorism Incident:

The purpose of this Appendix is to provide a method for addressing threats, making notifications, and taking initial actions during a threat or when an event occurs with no warning. This information is included for illustration purposes only. Each situation is unique, as are local conditions and protocols.

**Receipt of Threat,
Initial Local
Response**

A threat is received at the local, state or federal level. It is assumed that the threat will be conveyed to the appropriate law enforcement agency within that level. It is also assumed that the threat information will be shared between law enforcement agencies at appropriate local, state and federal levels. The first assessment will most probably be made by a local law enforcement agency. Unless that agency has specific information which would discount the credibility of the threat, a response should follow. This may be as simple as consulting with other parties, to a physical response to the location threatened. The local law enforcement agency should take actions that they feel are prudent based on their assessment of the threat, the knowledge of the target, etc. This may range from evacuation, negotiation, tactical intervention, Explosive Ordnance Disposal procedures, etc., as dictated by the situation.

SSCOT

The State Standing Committee on Terrorism (SSCOT) has developed a protocol which will enable agencies to call one number - the OES Warning Center - to ensure that appropriate state agencies and the FBI are notified of a threat or incident. In addition to such notifications, the SSCOT will ensure that appropriate state agencies communicate on a regular basis to enable the most appropriate state response, if appropriate.

**Initial Federal
Actions**

If the incident has been identified as a terrorist act, and notifications made, the local office of the FBI may initiate a response. This will generally be in proportion to the perceived significance of the threat, and the extent to which FBI has jurisdiction. The initial FBI point of contact will likely be Special Agents from a Resident Agency or Field Office. FBI Headquarters will be advised of the situation, and other federal agencies notified as dictated by the situation. If the initial assessment warrants, the FBI will begin a formal threat assessment process. This involves a joint assessment by experts, combining

knowledge of psychological factors, historic and intelligence records, and technical factors such as weapons and methods – all aimed at establishing the credibility of the threat.

Throughout this process, the FBI will act in concert and consultation with the local law enforcement agency and the state. Assuming the threat is deemed credible, FBI will work with local and state government to begin actions designed to neutralize the threat and/or to deal with its consequences. Depending on the nature and gravity of the threat, this may range from telephonic consultation to activation of a local EOC. *Note that though these events are typically considered as being within the “crisis phase”, the “consequence phase” planning begins at this point as well.*

**FBI Resources
Summoned**

If appropriate, additional FBI resources may be summoned. Among those that may become involved in the situation are:

- The Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC) - This is the FBI Headquarters center for command and control, located in Washington DC.
 - The Profiling and Behavioral Assessment Unit (PBAU) - This is a unit at Quantico, Virginia, that develops psychological profiles and assists in the credibility assessment process.
 - The Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) - This unit is trained and equipped to deal with chemical and biological agents that may be used in a terrorist act or threat.
 - The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) - This is an organization at FBI’s Quantico facility which includes several units, some of which are listed above. Included is the Crisis Management Unit, which assists local FBI offices in developing procedures and organization to deal with major situations such as terrorist acts. The agencies’ hostage negotiators also are affiliated with CIRG.
 - The Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) - Usually based on the East Coast, this unit is a highly mobile special weapons and tactics team.
-

Establishing Joint

At some point within this time frame, the Federal On-Scene

**Operations Center
(JOC)**

Commander (OSC) will begin the process of establishing a Joint Operations Center (JOC). This is essentially a hybrid EOC/CP which brings together many affected agency and organization representatives. The core operations are primarily composed of FBI personnel (if they have assumed jurisdiction), however there are local, operational area and state representatives included as well. The local and/or operational area EOC will interface and communicate with the JOC continuously, if they are not in fact co-located.

Note that in some smaller threats or incidents, local law enforcement (or if appropriate, state law enforcement i.e., CHP) will retain jurisdiction and control of the entire process, with the federal law enforcement community providing only support and resources.

**Threat
Executed/Event
Occurs**

If there is no threat, and an act occurs, most of the steps indicated above occur in more rapid succession - or almost simultaneously. When the event occurs, response is largely dependent on the nature of the act and the dimensions of its impact. *For a time, crisis and consequence response occur on a simultaneous basis.* The critical decision must be made whether to turn the location of the event into a crime scene. While lifesaving and life safety are always the pre-eminent considerations, every effort must be made to contain the scene, limit access, and preserve that which remains.

Assuming the scene is eventually stabilized, law enforcement, federal, local, or some combination thereof, will act to secure the perimeter(s) of the area; locate, process, preserve, and store the evidence; and deal with any human remains that may be involved. These activities may be supported by other entities ranging from the fire service to public works. At some point the crisis phase ceases. Meanwhile, the overall emergency management organization, using the tenets of SEMS, will continue to work to deal with the consequences of the act.

APPENDIX D (continued) - GENERAL NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES

Potential Notification Procedures This chart outlines potential notification procedures. This sequence will need to be modified any time there is a change in status, such as verification of a credible threat, information updates, and notification of an actual event. Additional agencies or organizations should be added as appropriate.

If received at	Notification Actions
City	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Notify local FBI Office• Notify OA/County• Notify city departments: Police, Fire, EMS, threat assessment unit as appropriate. Include other city staff as necessary• Notify appropriate State OES Administrative Region, if time-critical• Notification of other levels dependent upon nature of threat and security considerations
Co/OA	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Notify closest FBI Office• Notify city or cities that may be impacted• Notify county departments: Sheriff, Fire, medical, and threat assessment unit as appropriate. Include other Co/OA staff as necessary• Notify appropriate State OES Administrative Region• Notification of other levels dependent upon nature of threat and security considerations
OES Administrative Regions	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Notify appropriate FBI Field Divisions• Notify OES Headquarters• Notify state agencies as needed• Notify potentially impacted jurisdictions through appropriate OAs• Notification of other levels dependent upon nature of threat and security considerations
State OES Headquarters	Per procedures in the <i>California Terrorism Response Plan</i>

APPENDIX D (continued) - THREATCONS

The Department of Defense uses the term THREATCONS (Threat Conditions) to describe levels of threats. Military organizations will take certain security actions based upon the THREATCON status. THREATCON levels are usually posted in military installations and are changed (higher or lower) as the situation dictates. The THREATCONS are as follows:

Threatcon Normal	No threat of terrorist activity is present.
Threatcon Alpha	There is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against installations, building locations, and/or personnel, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.
Threatcon Bravo	There is an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity even though no particular target has been identified.
Threatcon Charlie	An incident has occurred or intelligence has been received indicating that some form of terrorist action is imminent.
Threatcon Delta	A terrorist attack has occurred or intelligence has been received that action against a specific location is likely.

APPENDIX D (continued) - RESPONSE TO A WMD THREAT

FBIHQ has developed a four-tiered system of describing a developing situation and the thresholds at which particular Federal WMD assets should, in general, be called upon by the SAC to respond to incidents or threat conditions. The Threat Levels are:

- | | |
|--|---|
| A. Threat Level 4: Minimal Threat | Received threats do not warrant actions beyond normal liaison notifications or placing assets or resources on a heightened alert (agencies are operating under normal day-to-day conditions). |
| <hr/> | |
| B. Threat Level 3: Potential Threat | <p>Intelligence or an articulated threat indicate a potential for a terrorist incident. However, this threat has not yet been assessed as credible.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• This should initiate the credibility assessment process.• Notify FBIHQ immediately (WMDOU or SIOC).• As a part of the on-going contingency planning process during the developing crisis, deployment plans for follow-up resources should be made, should they be required. |
| <hr/> | |
| C. Threat Level 2: Credible Threat | <p>A threat assessment indicates that the potential threat is credible, and confirms the involvement of WMD in the developing terrorist incident. Intelligence will vary with each threat, and will impact the level of the federal response. At this threat level, the situation requires the tailoring of response actions to use federal resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve the crisis. The federal response, led by the FBI, will focus on law enforcement actions taken in the interest of public safety and welfare, and is predominantly concerned with preventing and resolving the threat. FEMA will support the federal response with consequence management planning and pre-positioning of tailored resources, as required. The threat increases in significance when the presence of an explosive device or WMD capable of causing a significant destructive event, prior to actual injury or loss, is confirmed or when intelligence and</p> |

circumstances indicate a high probability that a device exists. In this case, the threat has developed into a WMD terrorist situation requiring an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of federal augmentation to state and local authorities in response to the potential consequence of a terrorist use or employment of WMD. At this point, the OSC has the following options:

- Deployment of the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST) to aid the SAC should be considered/requested. As the situation develops and warrants, follow-on resources should be requested.
 - A Joint Operations Center (JOC) should be established to manage the developing crisis in the interagency environment incorporating law enforcement planning concerns with consequence management concerns.
-

D. Threat Level 1: WMD Incident

A WMD terrorism incident has occurred which requires an immediate process to identify, acquire, and plan the use of federal augmentation to state and local authorities in response to limited or major consequences of a terrorist use or employment of WMD. This incident has resulted in mass casualties. The federal response is primarily directed toward public safety and welfare and the preservation of human life.

- FEMA would lead the federal government's efforts to respond to the devastation through consequence management in support of the FBI as the Lead Federal Agency (LFA).
- A Joint Operations Center (JOC) should be formed to integrate consequence management concerns with the law enforcement effort. The perpetrators may have additional devices. The investigation should continue under the JOC command concept until the threat of additional devices is mitigated or other contingencies regarding the incident are resolved. The incident site may expand to multiple sites which

can be strategically coordinated by the JOC.

- All chemical, biological, or nuclear material should be approached by authorized personnel only, which includes the Hazardous Materials Response Unit (HMRU) and/or Technical Escort Unit (with HMRU coordination).
 - No untrained field agent should inspect known or suspected chemical, biological, or nuclear materials. Field testing and transportation for lab testing is to be coordinated with HMRU.
-

APPENDIX D (continued) - THREAT REPORT ELEMENTS

The following data elements are suggestions. They are not all inclusive. Many agencies have very complete and sophisticated threat reporting, analysis, and notification systems. These data elements are offered:

1. to provide a minimum, common baseline database.
2. to provide jurisdictions without existing systems a point of departure for development of their own threat reporting, analysis, and notification systems.

Data elements to consider when taking an initial report:

- Report date/time:
- Report received by (name, organization, and phone number or EMAIL):
- Threat transmitted by (telephone, fax, EMAIL, video, mail, other):
- Type of threat (bomb, chemical, biological, radiological, “cyberterrorism”, hostage situation, other):
- Description of threat:
 1. Content of threat
 2. Characteristics of threat (describe caller, describe FAX, describe EMAIL, describe video, describe mail, etc.):
- Target(s) of threat (specified or potential based upon data):
- Timelines (when is the event going to occur?):
- Brief initial assessment of threat:
- Other agencies/organizations notified of threat:
- Has any individual, group, or organization claimed responsibility for threat/event?

APPENDIX D (continued) - THREAT ANALYSIS

Data elements to consider during threat analysis for a threat analysis report.

- Technical feasibility (Is this threat technically feasible?):

Technical analysis prepared by (organization):

- Operational practicality (Is the threat operationally possible to accomplish?):

Operational feasibility analysis prepared by (organization):

- Behavioral resolve (Do the potential terrorist have the resolve, moral support, or behavior profile?):

Behavior analysis prepared by (organization):

- Final analysis/conclusion (Is the threat credible? If so, why? If not, why?):

Final analysis/conclusion prepared by (organization):

Date/time of report:

APPENDIX D (continued) - NOTIFICATION ACTIONS

Data elements to consider for notification.

- Date/time of Notification:
- Notification made by (agency/individual name):
- Summary of threat (who, what, when, how, why):
- Summary of threat analysis (conclusion and agency making analysis):
- Recommended courses of action:
 - Agencies to notify:
 - EOCs or Command Post Activations (federal, state, local, private organizations/businesses):
 - Possible response resources required (law enforcement, fire and rescue, medical, public works, etc.):
- Report received by (organization/name):



Unified Command And SEMS: A Guide for State & Local Government

FINAL DRAFT—June 11, 1998—FINAL DRAFT
(For SEMS Advisory Board Approval)

**Governor
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**Richard Andrews
Director
Governor's Office of Emergency Services**

Unified Command And SEMS: A Guide for State and Local Government

Purpose And Scope

This document clarifies how local, state, and federal agencies can successfully manage emergency incidents through the application of unified command at the field level of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS).

SEMS is mandated for state agencies, voluntary for local governments (but necessary for reimbursement of response-related personnel costs), and not required for federal agencies.

General Concept

The Response Structure

State and local agencies use the Incident Command System (ICS) as the structure to manage emergency incidents at the field level of SEMS. ICS incorporates the concept of unified command when more than one agency is responsible for the emergency incident. This system allows agencies to exercise their responsibilities without compromising jurisdictional authorities.

There are four elements to consider when applying unified command:

A. Policies, Objectives, Strategies

The responsibility to set joint policies, objectives, and strategies for an incident belongs to the various jurisdictional and agency administrators who set policy and are accountable to their agencies. This activity is done in advance of tactical operations and may be coordinated from a location other than where the field response is taking place.

B. Representatives

The unified command organization consists of the on-scene senior representatives (agency incident commanders) from the various agencies with responsibility for the incident.

C. Resources

Unified command resources are the personnel and equipment supplied by the jurisdictions and agencies that have responsibility for the incident.

D. Operations

Unified command resources stay under the administrative and policy control of their agencies; however, operationally, resources are deployed by a single Operations Sections Chief based on the requirements of the consolidated action plan. Consolidated action plans identify objectives and strategy determinations for the incident made by the unified command. The incident objectives must adequately reflect the needs of all the jurisdictional agencies.

Unified command represents an important element in increasing the effectiveness of response to multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incidents. As incidents become more complex and involve more agencies, the need for unified command is increased.

**Interagency
Agreements**

Agencies that will be partners in a unified command situation should, whenever possible, establish agreements in advance of emergency incidents that identify jurisdictional and functional responsibilities and delineate the elements of the unified command structure. In addition, agencies should take every opportunity to exercise the provisions of these agreements through periodic training and simulation drills.

SEMS Applied—Coordinating Diverse Authorities

A cornerstone of SEMS is the application of ICS in emergency incident management at the field level. Under this system, unified command must be used when emergency incidents involve multiple agencies and/or jurisdictions. The basic precept of unified command is that all agencies with jurisdictional responsibility for the incident will manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating agency authority, autonomy, responsibility or accountability. Therefore, in order for state and local agencies to be consistent with SEMS, the unified command must include all the individual authorities with response jurisdiction over the incident.

Any process used by the unified command must permit the command team to develop a consolidated action plan that adequately reflects the jurisdictional needs of the agencies with responsibility for the incident. Unified command is based on the presumption that all responsible agencies will cooperate in a collective effort to mitigate an incident.

Recommendations For “Best Practices”

When addressing pre-existing mandates within SEMS, the following guidelines should be applied.

- 1) ***SEMS must be viewed as a structural system only, not a preemption authority.***

SEMS is an emergency response management structure designed to focus resources and effort in the most efficient fashion. It is an “overlay” to pre-existing mandates in statute and regulation. It does not re-direct or preempt these authorities.

- 2) ***Jurisdictional authorities must not be compromised.***

A basic precept of unified command is that jurisdictional authorities responsible for the incident are never excluded from the command structure. The legal requirements for federal, state, and local agencies must be taken into account when developing a consolidated action plan. Exactly how those jurisdictional authorities function in the unified command is a matter to be determined according to the details of the incident and the parties involved.

- 3) ***Jurisdictional mandates must be applied within SEMS in a flexible manner.***

SEMS is meant to be flexible and applicable to many disciplines involving many agencies. There will almost always be overlapping authorities subject to interpretation. Federal, state, and local agencies must coordinate with each other in applying and exercising their respective authorities within the unified command. Individual agencies do not exercise jurisdiction or authority that exceeds their legal limits or usurp the authority of another agency—there is no “vote” inside the unified command. It is incumbent upon the agencies involved to cooperate in order to allow for a successful resolution to a complicated emergency response organizational issue. Often, these issues can be dealt with through pre-planning.

- 4) ***Pre-planning and training must be continuous.***

It is essential to the success of efficient emergency management that jurisdictions and functional agencies pre-establish the unified command structure and conduct frequent drills to exercise the system.

5) *Cooperation and consensus must be a priority.*

It is impossible to implement unified command unless the responsible agencies have agreed to participate in the process. Once this has been achieved, incident management goals, objectives and strategies are established through a consensus process.

6) *Establishment of the unified command structure must be expedited.*

Implement unified command promptly when it is needed in a multi-jurisdictional or multi-agency incident. It is essential to begin joint planning as early as possible, especially on those incidents where there may be conflicting priorities based on agency responsibilities. Initially the participants should: identify statutory authorities for all agencies; determine a clear functional structure for the incident; coordinate initial activities; and open clear communication channels at all levels of the organization. Conversely, individual agencies in the unified command should not exit the response structure until their jurisdictional responsibilities have been resolved and an orderly transition has been orchestrated.

7) *Proper integration into the ICS structure is essential.*

A member of the unified command is very different than an agency representative. The unified command consists of agencies with direct jurisdictional responsibility for the incident. Agency representatives are individuals assigned to an incident from assisting or cooperating agencies. Agency representatives are personnel other than those on direct tactical assignments or those involved in a unified command.

Summary

SEMS provides the structure for managing the response to multi-agency and multi-jurisdiction emergencies in California and facilitates coordination among all responding agencies. Within SEMS, ICS provides a flexible structure at the field level for coordination of response activities which is geared to the needs of a specific incident. Unified command allows agencies that have responsibility for an incident to meet their statutory requirements through a coordinated process involving diverse jurisdictional authorities.

GENERAL AUTHORITIES AND DEFINITIONS

1. Pursuant to Government Code Section 8607(d) all state agencies are required to use the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to coordinate multiple jurisdiction or multiple agency emergency and disaster operations.
2. Government Code Section 8607(e) requires a local agency to use SEMS in order to be eligible for reimbursement of personnel-related response costs.
3. Under CCR, Title 19, Section 2403 there are five levels of the SEMS organization. The field response level “commands emergency response personnel and resources” to carry out “tactical decisions and activities in direct response to an incident or threat.”
4. Under CCR, Title 19, Section 2405 emergency response agencies operating at the field response level shall use the Incident Command System, incorporating the functions, principles and components of ICS.
5. Under CCR, Title 19, Section 2402 emergency response agencies include “any organization responding to an emergency....”
6. Pursuant to CCR, Title 19, Section 2407(c), “communications and coordination shall be established between a local government EOC, when activated, and any state or local emergency response agency having jurisdiction at an incident occurring within a local government’s boundaries.”
7. Pursuant to CCR, Title 19, Section 2407(d), local government is to “use multi-agency or inter-agency coordination to facilitate decisions for overall local government level emergency response activities.”
8. Pursuant to Government Code Section 8616, during a state of emergency, “outside aid” to a local government shall be rendered in accordance with approved emergency plans.
9. Pursuant to Government Code Section 8618, unless otherwise expressly provided by the parties, the responsible local official in whose jurisdiction an incident requiring mutual aid has occurred “shall remain in charge at such incident, including the direction of personnel and equipment provided him through mutual aid.”
10. CCR, Title 19, Section 2405(a)(3)(C), defines the Unified Command structure as, “...a unified team effort which allows all agencies with responsibility for the incident, either geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating agency authority, autonomy, responsibility, or accountability.”
11. The state has broad authority under the Emergency Services Act to address any local need in a declared emergency if the conditions warrant. Government Code Sec. 8614 states:

- (a) Each department, division, bureau, board, commission, officer, and employee of each political subdivision of the state shall render all possible assistance to the Governor and to the Director of the Office of Emergency Services in carrying out the provisions of this chapter.
 - (b) The emergency power which may be vested in a local public official during a state of war emergency or a state of emergency shall be subject or subordinate to the powers herein vested in the Governor when exercised by the Governor.
 - (c) Ordinances, orders, and regulations of a political subdivision shall continue in effect during a state of war emergency or a state of emergency except as to any provision suspended or superseded by an order of regulation issued by the Governor.
12. CCR, Title 19, Sec. 2405(a)(3)(D), defines consolidated action plans as ones that, "...identify objectives and strategy determinations made by the Incident Commander for the incident based upon the requirements of the jurisdiction. In the case of a unified command, the incident objectives must adequately reflect the policy and needs of all the jurisdictional agencies. The action plan for the incident covers the tactical and support activities required for the operational period."
13. "Jurisdiction" describes a [legal] authority or responsibility, and can also mean a geographical area, e.g., a city, county, state, federal lands, etc. (SEMS Approved Course of Instruction Field Course, Module 13—Unified Command—August 1995 Instructor Guide.)
14. "Agency" is used to describe organizations which have a legal and functional responsibility at an incident. These may be from the same jurisdiction, other jurisdictions, or represent functional governmental authorities which do not necessarily have a geographical influence. They can also represent industrial and commercial organizations from the private sector. Examples could include the coroners office, the FAA, the XYZ chemical corporation, etc. (SEMS ACI, Module 13, Instructor Guide.)

APPENDIX F - ACRONYMS

ARB	Air Resources Board
CALTRANS	California Department of Transportation (DOT in State Agency Tables)
CCC	California Conservation Corps
CDC	California Department of Corrections
CDF	California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
CDFA	California Department of Food and Agriculture
CHP	California Highway Patrol
CNG	California National Guard
CYA	California Youth Authority
DFG	California Department of Fish and Game
DHS	California Department of Health Services
DIR	California Department of Industrial Relations (CALOSHA)
DMAT	Disaster Medical Assistance Team
DOD	United States Department of Defense
DOE	United States Department of Energy
DOEd	United States Department of Education
DOJ	California Department of Justice United States Department of Justice
DOT	United States Department of Transportation
DPR	California Department of Pesticide Regulation
DTSC	California Department of Toxic Substances Control
DWR	California Department of Water Resources
EMSA	California Emergency Medical Services Authority
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
EOPT	Emergency Operations Planning & Training (OES Division)
FBI	United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (Justice Department)
FBI OSC	FBI Onscene Commander
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOSC	Federal On Scene Coordinator
FRERP	Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
FRP	Federal Response Plan
FTB	California Franchise Tax Board
HHS	United States Department of Health and Human Services
HMICP	Hazardous Materials Incident Contingency Plan
LFA	Lead Federal Agency
WMD/NBC	Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nuclear, Biological, Chemical
NCP	National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
NEST	Nuclear Emergency Support Team
NRT	National Response Team
OEHHA	California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment
OES	California Office of Emergency Services
OSC	Onscene Commander (FBI)
REOC	Regional Emergency Operations Center (OES)

SEMS	Standardized Emergency Management System
SEP	State Emergency Plan
SOC	State Operations Center
SSCOT	State Standing Committee on Terrorism
SWRCB	California State Water Resources Control Board
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USEPA	United States Environmental Protection Agency